Nothing is ever over until the end: on religion, power and order by Milbank, John
1 
 
Nothing is ever over until the end: On religion, power and order 
John Milbank 
 
I 
Nothing is ever over. On my recent return from holiday in Ireland, I passed through 
Carrickfergus, a Protestant town in the majority-Protestant North. There, on the quayside, 
sure enough, in front of the imposingly intact Castle, was a statue to the Dutch Prince and 
eventual King of England, William of Orange, object of the fiercely anti-Papist cult of ‘King 
Billy’. To my dismay, I saw that the date of the statue was 1990, already after the easing of 
the worst of the recent troubles.  
The events it commemorates can seem to us, perhaps wrongly, as but the tail-end of the 
wars of religion in Europe at the end of the 17th C. With an extended assumption of 
belatedness and anachronism, we tend to view modern Irish quarrels, which could be 
tragically reignited by the Brexit vote, as evidence of a backwardness at the far end of 
Europe. Yet were the recent conflicts of Catholic and Protestant in the north of that island 
merely a matter of lingering and throwback, or were they somehow a harbinger of a new 
global era in which the linking of religion with violence and terrorism has come to seem 
horribly normal rather than bizarrely aberrant?  
After all, it is a simplification to imagine that the Irish tensions have been consistently 
present ever since the 17th C. The first militant Irish republicans in the early 19th C were 
Protestants, not Catholics. The first leaders of the campaign for home rule and the first 
revivers of Irish culture were often members of the more humane faction of the Protestant 
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landowning ascendancy (such as the Gore-Booths of Lissadell House in County Sligo, as 
celebrated by the poet W.B Yeats) and a militant linking of Catholicism and Republicanism 
arose only from about the year 1900. And it would have remained a largely feared and 
scorned minority tendency within Ireland, were it not for the triple contingency of the First 
World War, British over-reaction to the Easter Rising and Ulster anger at perceived 
Republican treachery in contrast to the particularly terrible sacrifices of Northern Irish 
troops at the battle of the Somme. Thus were set in train patterns of politico-religious 
sectarianism, undergirded by dire myths of anger and resentment, that are specifically 
modern and even 20th C in character, and in no ways mere archaic survivals. What is more, 
the relative contemporary vigour of religion in Northern Ireland has its light as well as its 
dark side. It helps to shape strong family and community life, as evidenced by the 
consistently best educational results for the United Kingdom as a whole and perhaps within 
Ireland itself.  Eire is indeed more subject to a secularisation that has ironically much more 
eroded in several places an authentic Irishness and has still more despoiled the Irish 
landscape with bungalows and quasi-American dream-homes.   
A dreadful and still more ironic warning to the English lurks here: the very attempt to 
achieve cultural purity and self-control by national sovereignty may risk losing it through a 
denial of complex diversity and ineradicable connectedness. In the case of Southern Ireland, 
this has to do both with the Protestant and the Anglo-Irish legacy which are simplified and 
traduced by being filed under ‘colonialism’, just as the ancient link to the west of Scotland is 
suppressed by calling the ancient native language ‘Irish’ rather than ‘Gaelic’, in especial 
forgetfulness of the fact that the Gaelic  spoken by the largely Catholic, and rarely 
Nationalist population of north Antrim in the north-eastern corner of Ireland (‘The Glens of 
Antrim’) was itself of a Scottish dialect variety. The problems of an absolutism about identity 
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are vividly illustrated by the bizarre nature of the road border between northern and 
southern Ireland, which it is too risky to mark for ideological and security reasons, such that, 
as in a dream, one suddenly finds that one is driving kilometres not miles and that the road-
markings are entirely different. Thus a mythically absolute boundary cannot be inscribed 
even though its effects are all too real. (And incidentally the Southern Irish still think and 
talk in miles, just as they listen to the BBC, contribute money to the British Royal National 
Lifeboat Institute in boxes at the supermarket while lamenting their own lack of a National 
Health Service). The attempt at political corralling of a culture tends in Ireland, in stark 
contrast to say Wales which projects its identity more securely in linguistic and cultural 
terms, to backfire: thus one gets Americanisation built on an uncritical adulation of the USA, 
dream-homes, widespread governmental corruption and the tax haven recently and rightly 
reproved in the case of Apple by the EU, all of which was surely not what the Fenians fought 
for.  
In the case of England, a quest for purity in relation to a still vaster mainland would make 
even less sense and would be likely to have even direr consequences, including a decadent 
decline into offshore tax-haven status. The English have never really existed in any such 
political, linguistic or literary purity besides their complex relations to their Celtic margins 
which exceed formal geographic borders, and their inevitable entanglements with close 
Continental neighbours – even if, from the Venerable Bede onwards, they have sometimes 
tried to claim so and sometimes (as with Bede) through a doublethink that turn by turn 
appropriates the Celtic or the Roman for a sheerly English identity.1   
                                                          
1 Bede, Ecclesiastical History of the English People (London: Penguin. 1990).  
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Today, in terms of its relation to the EU, the travails of England are starting to look not so 
unlike the travails of Ireland after all.  Nothing is ever over, because the post-Romantic 
European settlement on the nation state is inherently insecure, since identities remain 
complex and contested. Are the Ukrainians Russians, are the Catalonians Spanish, the 
Bretons French? Is Italian unity inviolable? Should Belgium split? Should the Flemish remain 
always dispersed between three different countries? Should Scandinavia, like the British 
Isles be politically unified at some level? And so on. Moreover, this ethno-political 
uncertainty is never far removed from religious uncertainty, as we see in the case of Russia 
and Eastern Europe. If the post-Romantic settlement was less than permanent, then so, 
also, has proved the post-Westphalian one. Cuius regio, eius religio only works if political 
and confessional boundaries can be made roughly to map onto each other, or at least be co-
ordinated. So long as they can be so, then religious conflict appears to be outdated. But in 
reality this effect might be more political than ideological, more to do with pragmatism than 
with the inevitable triumph of enlightenment. And if Ireland has been an exception to this, 
then so too is Britain, which may be nearly at the end of Europe, and yet has been central to 
the process of European modernisation, in the wake of the Dutch, and sometimes with their 
assistance and connivance.  
What is more, the British failure to resolve the Reformation crisis and so, apparently to be 
fully modern (of which the Irish situation is only the extreme instance within the British-Irish 
archipelago) is arguably linked in a positive fashion to its ultra-modernisation. What is this 
failure? It is the acceptance after the so-called glorious revolution of 1689 (which can be 
more ingloriously read as the Dutch seizure of the Crown!) of a radical religious plurality 
between Anglicanism and religious dissent and of somewhat drastically different (and 
increasingly so) currents within Anglicanism itself, which look very odd to any other 
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Protestant denomination. In effect, these divisions were a more muted echo of the grand 
conflict between Catholicism and Protestantism itself – as especially witnessed by the 
continued 18th C connections of High Church Anglican forces to Jacobite and so to Catholic 
or crypto-Catholic ones, especially powerful in the Gaelic margins.2  As the historian Robert 
Tombs has argued, these divisions have given later left-right divisions in British politics more 
of a quasi-religious sectarian, than an outright ideological character as on the Continent: 
ultimately the English, especially, remain Roundhead or Cavalier, dissenting  whig or 
established-Church Tory, rather than liberal-socialist or reactionary.3 (And one can read the 
Brexit vote as a populist Roundhead, still ‘anti-papist’ victory, as the psephological 
geography tends to bear out.) Appropriately then, a key site of recent Irish troubles, named 
Derry for Catholics or Londonderry for Protestants, is marked today by its indeed very 
‘Londonish’ centre, within the 17th C walls. Irish sectarianism is but British sectarianism writ 
large.  
But how is this lingering early modern feature dialectically connected to ultra-
modernisation? By the way in which it encouraged the emergence of a neutral, non-
religious speech appealing to reason and science as publicly normative standards – or rather 
by a mutation of the Roundhead become whig dissenting and low-Church trajectory in this 
more pragmatic direction.  
And indeed one should think more here of the Enlightenment as the long Reformation that 
of reformation as proto-enlightenment. For enlightenment was marked by Unitarianism and 
                                                          
2 See Daniel Szechi, The Jacobites: Britain and Europe, 1688-1788 (Manchester: Manchester UP, 1994); Paul 
Kléber Monod, Jacobitism and the English People (Cambridge, CUP, 1989).  
3 Robert Tombs, The English and Their History (London: Penguin, 2014), esp. 492-512.  
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Freemasonry, much more than by outright irreligion.4 And from the same perspective, the 
apparent British-Irish exception at the edge of Europe starts to look much less so. For it is 
arguably not so much that the English, by virtue of entrenched pluralism and the role of a 
somewhat revolutionary Protestantism, escaped the need for secular revolution, as in 
France, as rather, as Edmund Burke and William Cobbett surmised, that the French 
revolution was also a late work of radical reformation – of ‘deistic’ freemasons, besides 
being the revenge of the Jansenists against the Jesuits and of the Huguenots against the 
revocation of the Edict of Nantes, as recent historians have stressed.5 As with the English 
Reformation, its primary act was the seizure of the ecclesial patrimony, while the arguments 
over Church governance, as William Doyle suggests, were the primary instigators of the 
switch from constitutional reform to republican revolution.6  
 
II 
Religion alone delivers order as legitimation and ritually patterned control:7 thus after the 
collapse of the unified European order which was Christendom, various contested simulacra 
of Christendom perforce had to succeed it, and these all remained for the most part 
religious, right up to the most recent times. In this sense, God has only now returned 
because he never went away, even if he has remained sometimes half-concealed behind 
                                                          
4 See Margaret C. Jacob, The Radical Enlightenment: Pantheists, Freemasons and Republicans (Lafeyette, 
Louisiana: Cornerstone, 2006); S.J. Barnett, The Enlightenment and Religion: The Myths of Modernity 
(Manchester: Manchester UP, 2003).  
5 Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France (Stanford Cal: Stanford UP, 2001); William Cobbett, A 
History of the Protestant Reformation in England and Ireland [1827] (Charlotte NC: Tan Books, 2012); Barnett, 
The Enlightenment and Religion. 
6 William Doyle, The French Revolution: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: OUP, 2001). 
7 I have derived the science as power and religion as order contrast from Yuval Noah Hurari, Homo Deus: A 
Brief History of Tomorrow (London: Harvill Secker, 2016). But this essay is implicitly critical of some of his 
historiography and contentions.  
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pragmatic political arrangements not fully conceding their ultimately religious legitimation. 
However, the bloody ideological divisions that ensued upon the French Revolution led to an 
intensification of the earlier British attempt to mediate and override religious divisions in 
the name of Science and Reason. Now, with Auguste Comte (arguably the most important 
and influential thinker of modern times, though this is infrequently recognised), the quasi-
religious and ‘negative’ abstract idealism of enlightenment, looking for ‘emancipation’ in the 
name of rights etc, is abandoned by many in the name of a purely ‘positive’ cult of what is 
factually apparent and pragmatically works. In an exacerbation of Hobbes to the point of 
abandonment of his liberal solution, order is despaired of and so traditional religion refused. 
Instead, only power and the means of power remains (Nietszsche being but a variant of 
this). However, since order continues to be inescapably an exigency, a cult is to be made of 
power itself; the wielders of power are also to rule  and to ensure integration around their 
expertise and their promotion of ‘the human’ as the possibility of this power over nature, 
within and yet beyond nature herself.8  
Only with the invention of positivism, for political and ideological reasons, does any ‘conflict’ 
between science and religion historically begin, and it remains an entirely political conflict. 
And indeed it was not the only reaction to enlightenment: alongside positivism came also 
and in rivalry evangelical, pietist, Catholic and Orthodox revivals throughout the 19th C. 
There were also important hybrids: positivism itself was a curious inversion of the 
occasionalism, ontologism and voluntarism of post-revolution Catholic reaction and later, as 
with Action Franҫaise, this inversion was re-inverted: where power has once been 
                                                          
8 See Maurice Cowling, Mill and Liberalism (Cambridge: CUP, 1963). 
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sanctified, it can be rebaptised by a voluntarist and intégriste theology as after all religious 
order.9  
Whereas, then, the 18th C was still arguably a period of the long Reformation, of religion 
turned rationalist but remaining religious, the 19th C was a more paradoxical period of the 
simultaneous revival of more authentic modes of Christianity, alongside a much more 
virulent and explicit atheism, linked for the first time also to an outright scientism. As 
Charles Taylor has argued, the wake of the Romantic reaction against Enlightenment 
brought a situation not of uncontested secularism, but rather of inherently contested and 
unresolved issues around belief and non-belief.10  
What, then, of the 20th C and of the 21st? One can argue that one can divide this period into 
four different epochs. In the first, stretching from roughly 1900 to 1945, modes of atheistic 
positivism, focussed around naturalistic quasi-religions of race or class seized power, but 
were finally defeated, with a time-lag in the case of Communism lasting up till 1990. In the 
second, stretching from 1945 till 1990, a historic compromise was for a time arrived at 
between Christianity and a revived enlightenment around a humanism enshrined in notions 
of universal rights and human dignity.11 For a very brief interval, from 1990 to 2001, it 
looked as if this compromise could universally triumph and bring about an Hegelian end of 
history. But from 2001 to the present, this compromise has variously collapsed; scientistic 
and xenophobic, sometimes religious modes of positivism have returned, and a largely 
unprecedented factor, the challenge of Islam on the borders and within the West itself has 
emerged.  
                                                          
9 See John Milbank, Theology and Social Theory (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006),  51-74 
10 Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Harvard Mass; Harvard UP, 2007).  
11 Samuel Moyn, Christian Human Rights (Philadelphia Penn: Pennsylvania UP, 2015).  
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All this returns us, in a sense, to the 19th C situation. And to 19th C-type paradox. For today 
we seem to witness the simultaneous further decline of religion and yet also various strong 
revivals of religion, especially if we are speaking in global terms. If God has returned, then it 
is not mainly insofar as he is now believed in, as rather that he is once more much spoken 
of, albeit often in an ignorant and uninformed fashion. Above all, whereas in the second 
recent epoch from 1945 to 1990, religion appeared to be marginalised as uncontroversial 
and harmless, if often seen as sentimental and foolish, now religious belief and religious 
ethical practice is highly contested, as arguably never before.  
Why should this be the case? There would seem to be several interlocking reasons. First, 
secular ideologies, or quasi-religions, like Marxism, Sociology and Freudianism, have 
drastically lost their credibility in a process that stretches back as far as the 1960’s. A 
resulting void of postmodern relativism has been speedily filled by claims to erect 
ontologies solely on the basis of ascertainable natural science. Often linked to this is a new 
ideology of the secular as such, whose content is not so much the positive replacement of 
religion as negative hostility towards it, even if comically strenuous efforts are made to turn 
this negativity into an actionable content, as in the case of ‘humanistic funerals’ which, 
naturally, are both more and less funereal than the real thing. Nevertheless, one should not 
read ‘Dawkinsism’ as a substitute for lost ideological hope, so much as a new repristination 
of always central positivist content. For arguably the apparent positivity of the older 
ideologies always masked a secretly negative, anti-religious core, such that the destruction 
of the iconic, the symbolic and the meaningful to leave a residue of pure power alone and 
its cult, always lay at the heart of fascism, Nazism and communism. Dawkinsism is but a 
clearer embrace of scientism as always the heart of secularism, even if Dawkins himself, to 
his inconsistent credit, retains a sentimental humanistic overlay. While, indeed, the post 
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1960’s philosophy and history of science for a time relativised scientific claims, a militant 
scientism in Britain, at any rate, only lay dormant. From the time of Thomas Huxley 
onwards, proof of atheism was often the concealed purpose of British biology (in rather the 
same way that soft paganism and would-be cultured rationalism has often been the secret 
and obnoxious purpose of Oxbridge Classics) rather than being its regrettable implication, as 
the heterodox Cambridge biologist Rupert Sheldrake has argued.12 In this way Dawkins is 
the rising to the surface of something hitherto concealed. And beyond Dawkins, a more 
militant neo-positivism is now proclaiming that only informational data is real, with human 
beings reduced to input-output loci and human freedom and uniquely creative and 
judgemental intelligence being denied.13 In political terms, of course, this is a programme 
for a yet further increased rule by experts and the proletarianisation, pacification and 
perhaps partial extermination of the rest of the population.  
In the second place, one could posit that the reason for this rising to the surface is not so 
much an outrage that religion still lingers, as a fear that it could return in the wake of the 
collapse of secular political and therapeutic hope. For all the continued popular erosion of 
religion, there are signs of European revival amongst more educated groups in an era where 
only sophisticated religion appears to offer strong overarching and hopeful worldviews. And 
so to some extent the hysteria of the new-atheism, arising already in the 1990’s, can be 
retrospectively regarded as a prophylactic protest against Christian intellectual recovery.  
                                                          
12 Rupert Sheldrake, The Science Delusion (London: Coronet, 2013), 13-27, 291-317.  
13 See Paul Mason, Postcapitalism (London: Allen Lane, 2016). But the pessimistic aspects of this book are 
more convincing than the optimistic. Data no more overflows the reach of Capitalism than production was 
once held to do – indeed both the datum and the product in their supposedly pure factual positivity are 
specifically capitalist products and capitalism controls (as with Google) most of all our apparent freedom in 
handling data. 
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In the third place, the comfortably agnostic philosophy of the twentieth century, whether 
phenomenological or analytic, has succumbed to a metacritique of its critical stance.14 
Foundational boundaries projected against speculation have been deconstructed, and, in 
consequence, beyond a dogmatic scepticism whose dogmatism has in turn been 
questioned,15 we see the return of a now admittedly speculative metaphysics, whether 
naturalistic or spiritualistic in form. The practical aspect of this abrupt transformation (which 
has left much of an older academic generation floundering) concerns the inadequacy of an 
ethical humanism based upon consensus as to the primacy of negative liberty and minimal 
contentment. For in a situation of increased cultural and ethnic plurality it quickly turns out 
that people’s notions of allowable freedom and of the content of contentment vary wildly, 
encouraging extremism if such notions are not tempered by educated reflection, as Quentin 
Meillassoux has contended.16 And equally, once humanism had finally slipped from its 
Christian moorings, it embarked upon a questioning of the sanctity of life both at birth and 
death, of the psychic besides corporeal significance of sex, and of the integrity of given 
biological identities, especially those of gender.  
Inevitably this latter development has meant a practical and not just theoretical clash 
between thoroughly secularised people and those still adhering to Christian faith, for whom 
the secularists, in seeking to guard the human, had in fact abandoned it and started to 
license murder, as with much abortion, besides the appalling and uncontrollable license 
now given to euthanasia both in the Netherlands and in Belgium, and to license physical 
self-abuse, as with claimed medical alteration of gender and now even deliberate 
                                                          
14 John Milbank, ‘Only Theology Saves Metaphysics: On the Modalities of Terror’ in Belief and Metaphysics, ed. 
P.M. Candler and C. Cunningham (London: SCM, 2007), 452-500 and ‘The Mystery of Reason’ in The Grandeuur 
of Reason: Religion, Tradition and Universalism eds. P.M> Candler and C. Cunningham (London: SCM, 2010), 
68-117.  
15 See Graham Priest, Beyond the Limits of Thought (Cambridge: CUP, 1995), 236-240. 
16 Quentin Meillassoux, Aprés la finitude: essai sur la necessité de la contingence (Paris: Seuil, 2006).  
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amputation of limbs. To say that all this is an abuse of medicine and a denial of the 
Hippocratic oath is putting it mildly.  
But whatever one thinks about these issues, the main point here is that such disagreements 
render the whole notion of religious toleration inherently problematic. To what extent can 
individual religious people or religious bodies be granted exceptions with respect to new 
secular norms of birth, death, sexuality and gender, if thereby they are violating what are 
now perceived to be fundamental human rights? Above all, can religious bodies have any 
corporate legislative power to constrain the actions and beliefs of their members if these 
are regarded as primarily citizens, defined by an equal autonomy of action? In all honesty 
we do not any longer collectively agree about the value and range of religious tolerance. 
And this ancient night of irresolvable religious disagreement seems to have fallen suddenly 
upon our secular day. Once more, indeed, nothing seems to be really over after all.  
And in the future these disagreements will only be exacerbated as the further release of 
power and possibility is construed as a fundamentally good thing, only to be controlled by 
the most powerful manipulators of such power in the interests of further freedom, which, 
for all the egalitarian rhetoric, can only mean the ever greater freedom of the most 
powerful. Read subversively, in the spirit of J.R.R. Tolkien and C.S. Lewis, one could argue 
that this is not the triumph of science over superstition, but of a kind of black because 
indifferent magic of control (which often indeed manipulates physical forces and affinities 
whose nature it does not fully understand) over the white magic of art and liturgy which 
admits a certain magical kinship between soul and matter, and a certain theurgic ability of 
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certain incantations to mediate the divine.17 If the black magic of scientism denies this 
kinship, its necromancy lies precisely in the unadmitted psychic attraction of the very 
powerful to blind processes of force with which they seek to be as one, even to the extent 
of a contradictory denial of their own liberty which they nevertheless seek thereby to 
augment.   
In the fourth place, one has the new irruption and incursion of a radicalised Islam to which, 
for example, an estimated 45% of British mosques can be held to belong (specifically to the 
Deobandi sect)18 even though that in no way means that, for the overwhelming most part, 
they support acts of terrorism. This irruption has exacerbated the return of God in an 
extremely complex and frequently paradoxical way. Leftist forces, now often defined mainly 
be their secularism, may strategically ally with Islamists in perceived opposition to Western 
colonialism, the state of Israel and even, sotto voce, a supposed Jewish plutocracy. 
Meanwhile, the mainline churches too often decide simplistically to defend religious identity 
and liberty as such, without sufficiently considering that at least some of the humanist and 
secular legacy, as regards for example the equality of women, the freedom of religious 
attachment, and the non-sacrality of the politico-legal field is a post-Christian outcome. To 
be authentically Christian, the Churches need to place themselves somewhat in the middle 
as regards the quarrel between secularity and theocratic autonomy. It is correct, for 
example, to insist on the sheer absurdity of actually requiring women to be semi-naked on 
beaches, even though one should defend to the end their right to be so if they choose. But 
on the other hand, the churches should join those who protest against the Scottish police 
force decision to allow the Hijab as part of a police uniform. This is frightening, because no 
                                                          
17 J.R.R. Tolkien, ‘On Fairy Stories’ in Tree and Leaf (London: Unwin, 1972), 11-70; C.S Lewis, That Hideous 
Strength (London: MacMillan, 1965).  
18 Melanie Philips, ‘It’s pure myth that Islam is a “religion of peace”’ in The Times, Friday, August 26th, 2016.  
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such conspicuous Christian, Jewish or Hindu symbol would be allowed, and rightly not. A 
policeperson should appear before you solely as a representative of secular law, and not as 
the direct representative of any faith whatsoever. So what we seem to have here is a 
worrying concession to radical Islamic pressure in (Hijabic…) disguise. Instead, a defence of 
the legitimate rights of Islamic religion in the West (including the exercise of Sharia law, so 
long as its principles do not contradict those of secular law) should be matched by a demand 
for reciprocity in Islamic lands, which is so far in the main very little forthcoming.  
Yet currently, the more Christians concede against all the evidence that all and every 
religious ‘fundamentalism’ equally tends to violence (how many bombers are there really in 
the Bible belt?) then the more Christians themselves will be tarred with the brush of 
suspicion of religion as such, after every new Islamicist outrage. However admirable the 
advances anciently made in Arabic lands by Islam over a polytheistic past, and however far 
the Koranic legacy has often been brilliantly modified by Persian, Greek, Jewish, gnostic and 
Christian philosophical and mystical influences, it remains the case that Islam tries to 
reinstate the archaism of sacralised law and ‘desert monotheism’ as a new and somewhat 
perverse universal. This archaism follows almost inevitably from its unique claim to be a 
revelation beyond the Christian --  beyond, therefore, from a Christian point of view, the 
displacement of (according to St Paul) daemonically mediated human law and custom by 
the direct human presence of God himself in a non-repeatability that yet is now the 
paradoxical final example.  
The tendency of the mainline of Sunni Islam and the Kalam orthodoxy to reduce order to 
power in a theocratic sense, or to one where the gaps in the divine command are supplied 
by the commands of human tyrants who can sometimes be oddly viewed as somewhat 
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extrinsic to Islamic order (or even as belonging to a class themselves literally enslaved to 
ruling, as with the janissaries) involves indeed, as Emeritus Pope Benedict claimed at 
Regensburg, a certain difficulty with the mediation of the sacral by reason and the innate 
sacrality of reason itself.19 This difficulty was observed from within Islam by the great 
historical theorist Ibn Khaldun, when he argued that a desert order undergoes a certain 
necessary decadence and decline when subject to sophisticated urban reflexivity.20 
Something similar was later noted for all human historical development by the Neapolitan 
Giambattista Vico in the 18th C, yet Vico also suggested a certain acme or point of balance 
achieved by Catholic Christianity with its unique integration of tradition, imagination and 
emotion with rational reflection, preventing any idolatry of either the image or the abstract 
notion.21  
Reflecting on all this, one could suggest that the more the West suffers a radical Islamic 
incursion, alongside a tendency to the rise of irrational fundamentalisms inside Christianity, 
then the more it loses its acme, and the more it becomes subject to a Khaldunian oscillation, 
which is ultimately neo-pagan, for all that it is also Islamic. Thus today, as Christian 
universalism lapses, we see more and more an irresolvable tension between an abstract 
globalisation on the one hand, and atavistic localisms on the other, whether grounded in 
religious fundamentalism or in nationalism. Nothing is indeed ever over in a 21st Century 
where the counter-revolutionary spirit of Charles Maurras, so recently assumed to be as 
dead as Charlemagne, albeit now oddly mutated to claim also the mantle of revolutionary 
secularism could plausibly seize power in France before very long. 
                                                          
19 James V. Schaull, The Regensburg Lecture  (South Bend Ind: St Augustine’s Press, 2007). 
20 Ibn Khaldun, The Muqqadimah: An Introduction to History, trans. Franz Rosenthal (Princeton NJ: Princeton 
UP, 2005).  
21 Giambattista Vico, The New Science, trans. David Marsh (London: Penguin, 1999), §§ 1089-1092, pp 478-479. 
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III 
All these four developments have, in fact, implications for the Churches and theology which  
so far they have scarcely faced up to. In cultural, besides philosophical terms, there now 
remains no shared neutral ground from which a liberal theology might begin, and that is 
why liberal theology is so manifestly exhausted. It may happen that Christians will agree 
with those of other faiths or with atheists on this or that, or even on much, but never on an 
exactly coinciding (albeit somewhat overlapping) basis, and never with any definite clarity as 
to the bounds of a shared human area and the reserved spaces of faith or lack of it. Nothing 
is after all over (apart from the liberal dogma that it is) and everything is once again in 
principle contestable. Thus Christians can only, once more, take their stand ultimately on 
Christian grounds. 
This does not, however, mean that today, in inevitable rejection of theological liberalism, 
we should simply and uncritically espouse a received orthodoxy, whether Catholic, Eastern 
Orthodox, Anglican or Protestant. For to do so would be to fail to regard the advent of 
secularisation as a fundamental one for theology. Just why has it occurred? In part the 
answer may be far more contingent and banal than we suppose. For it can be a matter of 
observation today that the clergy and laity lack energy and often fail to do the obvious 
things, even though lost communities are crying out for fellowship, life, drama, celebration 
and meaning. Where these things are offered by Christians, a considerable measure of 
success usually ensues. Yet the fact that they are not sufficiently offered connects with the 
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pervasiveness of half-belief and an embarrassed lack of enthusiasm. For this reason one is 
returned, in the end, to the basic issue of belief and its absence.  
It is at this point that Christians have to ask themselves whether their orthodoxy and 
orthopraxis have after all been authentic enough. One can argue that very specific issues 
appear to view here. Charles Taylor argues that secularity ensued because of a rejection of 
the doctrines of hell and of an excessive ethical discipline or else, ironically, a secularisation 
of ethical discipline that freed itself from all religious festivity and celebration. There may be 
a sophisticated truth to the crude view that people have tended to reject Christianity 
because of repulsion at and refusal of the fear of eternal damnation, and dislike of clerical 
interference in their private and social joys.  
In both instances, of hell and the displacement of festivity by discipline, one has to ask 
whether a nominal orthodoxy was fully true to its Biblical, liturgical and Patristic roots? It 
may well be that there is no doctrine of eternal punishment in the New Testament and that 
original creedal orthodoxy, as with Origen, Irenaeus and the Cappadocians was worked out 
according to a logic that not only did not include it, but specifically depended upon and 
pointed to the final eschatological reconciliation of all things.22 Such a doctrine the most 
radically proclaims the omnipotence of God and yet construes this omnipotence as the 
omnipotence of love. Without apocatastasis, on the other hand, either God is construed as 
a tyrant, or his omnipotence is variously called into question. Although, indeed, Augustine 
and Aquinas were not guilty of the kind of deviation we find in late medieval thought and its 
tendency wrongly to play the created and the creative wills against each other, as though 
                                                          
22 See David Bentley Hart, God, Creation and Evil’ in Radical Orthodoxy: Theology, Philosophy, Politics, Vol 3, 
No 1 (Sept 2015), 1-17;  Ilaria L.E. Ramelli, The  Christian Doctrine of Apokatastasis: A Critical Assessment from 
the New Testametn to Eriugena (Leiden: Brill, Father John Whiteford’s depressing and pathetic attempt to 
rebut Hart requires that he regard Gregory of Nyssa, Maximus the Confessor and Isaac the Syrian, besides the 
supremely great Origen, as ‘heretics’.  
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they lay on the same place of reality, it may be that, in the long run, it is precisely the 
doctrine of eternal punishment that encourages this, along with somewhat resultant 
notions of the reserved absolute will of God as opposed to his ordained and creative will, 
and certainly resultant ideas of double predestination.23 Above all, it may encourage a 
gradual loss of a sense of participation as fundamentally ensuing from the notion of creation 
by a God in whom we ‘live, move and have our being’ (Acts 17:28) without any reserve. For 
if for all eternity there remains a hell outside of God, and God in some sense wills or allows 
this, then we have idolatrously allowed there to exist an area of being ontologically 
independent of him. Accordingly, the dominance after Bonaventure and Scotus of a univocal 
ontology may also be somewhat to do with this.  
The late medieval drift towards voluntarism, to a degree influenced by Islam, as Pope 
Emeritus Benedict rightly noted at Regensburg, was often espoused in the name of a 
stronger refusal of paganism and the pagan character of the neoplatonic legacy. Thus the 
inherent symbolisation and evocation of God in the created order was distrusted as overly 
necessitarian.24 Yet this refusal had a highly ironic upshot, strongly connected to the 
ultimate influence of Avicenna, who blended an Aristotelian necessitarianism, and a kind of 
atomised Platonism of immutable univocal essences, with elements of Islamic divine 
election and prophetic inspiration.25 In the hands of some of his Christian readers, this 
becomes more of an outright duality: thus in Henry of Ghent and still more in Duns Scotus 
for example, we see an absolute contrast of nature and will tending to determine all of their 
                                                          
23 This is to agree with David Bentley Hart that late Medieval deviations in the West are ultimately linked to 
some tendencies of the later Augustine, which can be read as being unconsciously at variance with the main 
liturgical and participatory thrust of his early and middle period writings.  
24 Ludger Honnefelder, Johannes Duns Scotus (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2005).  
25 See John Milbank, ‘Trinitarian Metaphysics after Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas’ in Tomismo Creativo: 
Letture Contemporanee del Doctor Communise d. Marco Salvioli O.P. (Bologna: ESD, 2015), 41-117.  
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theology.26 Just because freedom is seen as guaranteed only in absolute contrast to 
necessity, the same gesture which seeks to sustain the purity of will, paradoxically invokes 
as its shadow a realm of fixed natures, amongst which even God is forced to choose – a 
realm which ultimately in the west becomes that of disenchanted sheer subservience to the 
laws of non-contradiction, mathematics and inexorable physical mechanism.  
Therefore, in seeking to eschew the paganism of symbol and affinity, these theologians 
instead raised the spectre of pure blind, pagan fatality. To revert to the topos of magic 
earlier invoked, in seeking to banish all ‘white magic’ as after all diabolical, they instead 
invoked a secret Faustian darkness of the pure control of meaningless forces of sheer 
power. Already then, within the sphere of order, which is that of religion, they had started 
to erect instead the idol of power and of a perverse power through order, thereby undoing 
the central Christian conception of divine government, which fuses the ‘political theology’ of 
the Bible, where God is cosmic governor, with the Greek reflection on Being as such and its 
basic divisions.27  
This fusion, which is anticipated by the wisdom tradition of the Bible, finally tends to qualify 
one tendency in early Hebraic religion which tends to inherit the relative bleakness and 
fatalism of near-eastern polytheism, far from the groves of the Mediterranean, but to 
oppose to this not the capricious and bloodthirsty wills of several deities, but the absolute 
                                                          
26 See Etienne Gilson, Introduction à ses positions fondamnetales (Paris: Vrin, 2013).  
27 See Giorgio Agamben, The Kingdom and the Glory: For a Theological Genealogy of Economy and 
Government, trans Lorenzo Chiesa (Stanford Cal: Stanford UP, 2011), 1-16, 53-67; John Milbank,  
Beyond Secular Order: the Representation of Being and the Representation of the People (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 2013), ‘Preface; the Hidden Dimension of Humanity’, 1-18 and ‘Oikonomia leaves home: 
theology, politics and governance in the history of the west’, in Telos, forthcoming.  
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will of the God of Israel.28 It is this ‘desert monotheism’ or ‘Magianism’ (as Oswald Spengler 
described it)29 which the mainline of Sunni Islam in a sense curiously revives, and in such a 
manner that it can appear more as a ‘universal henotheism’ than a genuine monotheism 
which requires something like the neoplatonic thought of the One as ontological beyond the 
ontic, originally expressed as an excess of the ontological altogether. Obviously, some 
currents of Islam have absorbed just this qualifying sense of a true, absolute and 
transcendent unity, yet it is exactly these sorts of gains, with an accompanying allowance of 
a participatory and sacramental mediation of unity by saints and sacred sites which 
Wahabist, Salafist and kindred modern currents of Islam tend to deny. As with the history of 
some Calvinism, the spirit of iconoclasm and the spirit of anti-human violence do not then 
lie so far apart.30  
Compared to the shift away from order, or from the ‘theopoliticoontology’ of divine 
government,  the event of the Reformation is of small significance, as it but half -succeeded 
in rejecting it, and more often sustained and intensified it. Perhaps we can now see that 
currents of Renaissance Neoplatonism and hermeticism, later sustained by many on both 
sides of the post-Reformation divide, need to be reappraised for their orthodoxy, as is 
already happening with younger theologians like Michael Martin in the USA and follows in 
part the example of Hans urs von Balthasar in his recommendation of the Hermetic and 
sophiological reflections of Valentin Tomberg.31 For in the face of the half voluntarist, half 
darkly-fatalistic theology of the Terminists in the later Middle Ages, resultant from their 
                                                          
28 Régis Debray, God: An Itinerary, trans. Jeffrey Mehlman (London: Verso, 2014), 16-105, 129-130.  
29 Oswald Spengler, The Decline of the West: An Abridged Edition, trans. Charles Francis Atkinson (Oxford: OUP, 
1991), 341.  
30 James Noyes, The Politics of Iconoclasm: Religion, Violence and the Culture of Image-Breaking in Christianity 
and Islam (London: IB Tauris, 2016).  
31 Michael Martin, The Submerged Reality: Sophiology and the Turn to a Poetic Metaphysics (Kettering OH: 
Angelico, 2015), Hans Urs von Balthasar, ‘Afterword’ to Anonymous [Valentin Tomberg} Meditations on the 
Tarot: A Journey into Christian Hermeticism, trans. Robert Powell (New York: Putnam, 2002), 659-665.  
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strict rationalism that tended to regard relentlessly rigorous application of the law of non-
contradiction as the only philosophical touchstone, Renaissance thinkers from Cusa through 
Ficino to Robert Fludd and Thomas Vaughan in effect may have seen that one could only 
save the great orthodox tradition of symbolic realism and its authentic Hebrew-Greek 
hybrid, essential to genuine orthodoxy, if one admitted  its more hyper-rational elements of 
irreducible contradiction and natural magical affinity and so forth. These  elements were 
then increasingly seen within western culture, all the way to romanticism, as more 
accessible to emotion and imagination than to a reason debased as supposedly pure.  
This ‘alternatively modern’ tradition, as we increasingly know, never went away, even 
during the Enlightenment, and is at least as responsible, from the 12C onwards, for the 
development of modern science and the possibility of human intervention in nature as is the 
nominalist, mechanical legacy. Indeed its subtlety seems more to anticipate the mysteries of 
modern physics, while sustaining, like quantum mechanics, the sense that the physical 
world may not be alien to subjectivity and so the operations of power to the preferential 
intimations of order.32 As Henri de Lubac intimated, historically the Promethean may have 
arisen more with the pious mechanist than the admitted magus, even if one must definitely 
allow that symbolism can also walk on the dark and manipulative side.33  
As to the second religious instigator of secularisation, the abandonment of festival for 
discipline, this is in many ways the practical equivalent of the same shift from genuine 
order, to order through power. Instead of the ritual re-enactment and attempt to call down 
an eternal order, which lay in continuity with folk ecstasy and celebration (as argued by 
                                                          
32 See, for example, Hilary Gatti, Giordano Bruno and Renaissance Science (Ithaca NY State: Cornell UP, 1999); 
Ernst Benz, The Theology of Electricity, trans. Wolfgang Taraba (Eugene OR: Wipf and Stock, 2015). 
33 See John Milbank, The Suspended Middle: Henri de Lubac and the Renewed Split in Modern Catholic 
Theology (Grand Rapids Mich: Eerdmans, 2015), esp. 53-61.  
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Charles Taylor after Ivan Illich) western Christians during the course of the Middle ages 
increasingly stressed individual merit and behaviour, rendering even ritual in terms of a 
mechanical duty, in ways at which Protestants eventually and rightly protested. Yet most 
early modern Christians, whether Protestant or Catholic, sustained an excessive focus on 
individual morality whether as means to salvation or evidence of its presence, in a manner 
which tended to play down the problematic and often tragic continuity of what we can 
decide upon, with aspects of our natural and cultural situation and collective legacy upon 
which we cannot decide and can only be faced up to, and in certain more or less mysterious 
ways transformed, through religious devotion and liturgical performance.34 The Christian 
East continued to understand this rather better, and in such a way that all ethical and 
medical practice was situated within this wider symbolic and ritual content as the recent 
Russian novel Laurus, by Eugene Vodolazkin, set in the Russian Middle Ages, so vividly 
illustrates.35 Much of the western historical subordination of the laity, contempt for folk-
custom together with the more positive pagan survivals,36 and unimaginative harshness 
towards sexual issues is connected with this (which is not in any way to say that the East 
was altogether free of such faults).  
I would argue, therefore, that we need today a radicalised orthodoxy focused, as in the 
Christian origins, on apocatastasis, participation, immanent divine presence that is equally 
transcendence, symbolic realism, and the centrality of liturgy as theurgic re-enactment 
regarded as consummated in the Incarnation and Eucharist.  
                                                          
34 John Milbank, ‘On the Paraethical: Gillian Rose and Political Nihilism’ in Telos, Winter 2015, no. 173, 69-86.  
35 Eugene Vodolazkin, Laurus, trans. Laura C. Hayden (London: Oneworld, 2016). 
36 These were often better dealt with in Mediaeval Ireland, Wales and Iceland – as evidenced by such 
remarkable syncretic works of fiction as the Irish Colloquy of the Ancients, the Welsh Mabinogion and the 
Icelandic Poetic Edda. Something similar applies to Georgia in the East and its 12th C epic, The Knight of the 
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IV 
But what does this imply for the teaching of theology in the future? Here it can be 
contended that, ever since Schleiermacher, theology has been digging its own grave by over 
professionalization and over-concession to secular norms. As in the case of orthodoxy as 
such, so in the case of theology, we should be asking what is the real character of Christian 
teaching, of doctrina Christiana as Augustine called it? Since the Baroque era and still more 
since that of modern university theology since the early 19th C, we have thought of theology 
as first of all distinct from philosophy, and secondly as distributed into various sub-
disciplines. 
To take the latter first: the result of distinguishing Biblical Studies and Church History from 
the rest of theology is often a curious kind of double-think. On the one hand, they are seen 
as fundamental for all of theology, given that Christianity is a historically revealed and 
developing religion. On the other hand, they are also seen as strictly critical disciplines, 
external to theology as such. The aim would appear to be to elicit secular and academic 
credibility by founding theology in something indubitably positive, which, like all positivity is 
both backed by power and delegated to trace the indubitable marks of power, otherwise 
known since early modernity as ‘facts’. Yet this, of course, is to misconstrue revelation, 
which is from the threefold divine fount of personality to and through human persons, 
already by way of their response, which is liturgical.  
And the aim of currying favour is doomed to failure in the end, as we increasingly see today, 
for the secular academy will eventually find no reason why strictly objective studies cannot 
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be alternately housed in ancient Near Eastern studies, classical and historical departments 
and so forth.  
Instead of this approach, we need now to see that the apparently less defensible may be the 
more realistically so, because thereby theology can offer to the rest of the academy 
something that no one else can – namely a coherent claim to the mediation of the absolute 
by nature and history. Without the debatability of this claim, one could argue, the crucially 
constitutive university debate between the relative claims of power and order must 
necessarily lapse. Therefore, we need truly ‘theological theology’: departments where all 
those pursuing sub-disciplines remain nevertheless theologians, in the full systematic and 
philosophical sense, instead of appointing one or two people like that as a kind of 
indulgence and sop to the churches – who in any case, as they dangerously lapse into anti-
intellectualism, seem to require and respect such figures less and less.  
To revert now to the first point: the assumed separation of theology from philosophy. The 
upshot of this separation is that theologians, at least in their initial programme of study, 
tend to deal only with the philosophy of religion and not with philosophy as such, which is 
to say, with philosophy’s most ultimate scope, which is ontology. But this restriction 
inevitably dooms theology to cultural and academic marginality, for it means that it is 
assumed to have nothing fundamental to say about how things are or about what it means 
to be anything whatsoever. Instead, theology is seen as a regional discourse within the field 
of being, as both a set of debatable arguments as to the ultimate causes of finite being and 
a debatable claim to an event of revelation within the same field.  
Yet to set things up in this way is to beg all the fundamental Christian questions and 
arguably to betray the real ancient Christian intellectual legacy. Most crucially, it is to repeat 
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the late medieval undoing of divine government, and to split reality between a neo-pagan 
fated being on the one hand, and a deity fundamentally characterised by a will beyond 
natural constraint on the other. Thus, as Olivier Boulnois has now shown, the terms and 
disciplines of ‘ontology’ and ‘natural theology’ were of one single birth.37 Previously, as with 
Thomas Aquinas, for example, metaphysics had first concerned being, but then reached its 
consummation beyond its own subject matter in concluding to a creative cause of being as 
such, ‘common being’, ens commune, and not simply finite being as it happens contingently 
to exist. In this way, for Aquinas, in contrast with Scotus, existence in its very beingness is 
not just fatedly ‘given’, but is marked at its centre and yet beyond itself by its character as 
gift and sharing in the divine nature which coincides with a pure ‘to be’ or esse. Since the 
theology proper to metaphysics is inseparable from the whole of metaphysics, the 
theologian, as Aquinas conceives him, studies first the entire ontological field of philosophy, 
though by concluding to an unknown cause properly disclosed only by revelation also opens 
up the way to reconceiving ontological distribution in terms of the disclosures of esse itself 
in a divine-human event.38 
Earlier still and more radically, in the case of the Irish and Carolingian thinker John Scotus 
Eriugena’s astounding synthesis of the Patristic East and West, one sees a more drastic 
integration of the philosophical with the theological, to which Eckhart and Nicholas of Cusa, 
in the face of Scotist and Terminist ruptures, will later revert. For here, as Jean Trouillard has 
argued, one finds also a further development of the neoplatonic tradition itself, and a 
resolution of some of its quandaries in specifically Christian terms.39 In the case of the 
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38 Boulnois, Métaphysiques rebelles, 189-311. 
39 Jean Trouillard, Jean Scot Erigène (Paris: Hermann, 2014). 
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theurgic neoplatonist Proclus, beyond the perspectives of the first neoplatonist Plotinus, 
matter at the bottom of the scale of being had been granted a certain uniquely pure and 
non-reflective (unlike intelligence) imaging of the transcendent One, enabling it to operate 
as a vehicle for the ritual and the sacramental. Such a development took further the 
neoplatonic refusal of the gnostic denigration of matter as error.40 Yet Gnosticism possessed 
the advantage of accounting in dramatic terms for the contingency and henceforth fallen 
necessity of an ontological lapsus. Christianity, with Origen and Irenaeus, in effect 
transcended both Neoplatonism and Gnosticism by offering a drama of distortion which 
spoiled, for a while, both body and soul, yet then redeemed both such as to leave nothing 
behind.41  
In the case of Eriugena this synthesis is brought to a head, such that the corporeal is seen as 
the appropriate vehicle of theophany and we are eventually raised, not simply above the 
body, but also with the body transfigured back into its true, created spiritual essence. Unlike 
with Aquinas later, resurrection is regarded both as a natural destiny of the metamorphosis 
of all life back into its source which is also its fulfilment, besides being simultaneously a 
work of free grace, since creation is all the way down a free gift, such that the 
supplementary is paradoxically fundamental.42 By virtue of this more radically theophanic 
perspective, no road is left open in Eriugena, as it is marginally in Aquinas, towards a later 
and inauthentic duality of merely given nature as the realm of power and the gift of grace 
regarded too much as a work of  capricious  order.43  
                                                          
40 Trouillard, Jean Scot Erigène, 251-272. 
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 In this way, both the glory of the material mediator as created and echoing the One in its 
property as vehicle of shape and sign, and yet its lowly status (since it is now seen as 
contingently fallen, are accounted for), with the inherent nobility of the body as veil and yet 
disclosure of God being eschatologically restored. Beyond Neoplatonism hitherto, the other 
to the One is encompassed in terms of its eventual destiny as ‘created God’ to be reunited, 
though without total merger, with the ‘uncreated and uncreating’ original and abiding unity 
of everything.  
Ontological reality is reconceived by Eriugena as a kind of eternal Trinitarian metahistory in 
which God the ultimate principle only exists insofar as he creates himself beyond his own as 
it were ‘initial’ uncircumscribable and so unknowable infinity (taken from Gregory of Nyssa) 
as knowing, and knows himself as creating, and thereby relationally and dynamically lives 
and ‘effectively’ moves in the Spirit.44 Created reality is at once the realisation of this 
process and a distinct manifestatory participation in it, whereby each individual creature in 
different degrees simultaneously knows and creates itself (in terms of an outward ‘theurgic’ 
work of intellect informing body, not an internal ‘idealist’ work of mind projecting 
phenomena)45  and creatures mutually both know and create each other (including humans 
and angels) in the various degrees of mystical gnosis, reason, imagination, common-sensing 
and corporeal interaction.46  
The aporetic coincidence of constitution and manifestation of God is resolved by Eriugena in 
terms of eschatological arrival, when God is all in all – an achieved consummation that has 
always already been there at the core of the real. This is all in some ways proto-Hegelian, 
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yet, unlike for Hegel, there is no moment of necessary alienation, nor determination of 
knowing by a negative logic as opposed to a positively willed and yet theophanic act of 
creation. The appearance of alienation, the loss of intuition and the coarsening occlusion of 
our original bodies are all the contingent upshot of our fallenness.  
But redemption from this condition for Eriugena, much more emphatically than for Aquinas, 
never mind most later school theology, is simply the working and inevitable triumph of the 
original order of nature which nonetheless includes the order of grace. The eschaton is 
thereby as much ontological as it is metahistorical and by no means an arbitrary 
consummation, contingently willed by the deity.  
In such an ancient Christian outlook, order and power, ontological setting and revealed 
event are inseparable as aspects of a wider theory of reality that is both ontological and 
historical, and construed in terms of both divine government and the divine drama of the 
rescue of the divine glory. And for this reason, the discourse of Eriugena, like that of 
Aquinas, though still more so, does not really have a disciplinary name for us today.  
But I am convinced that theology should be once more doing something like this if it wishes 
to have any real contemporary impact in a situation where God has returned, but so far only 
to contestation. Nothing is ever over until the eschatological end of apocatastasis, and 
genuinely orthodox theology will not be over if it begins to re-anticipate it.  
